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Cosmopolitanism for Earth Dwellers: Kant on the 
Right to be Somewhere 
 
JAKOB HUBER 




The paper provides a systematic account of Kant’s ‘right to be somewhere’ as 
introduced in the Doctrine of Right. My claim is that Kant’s concern with the 
concurrent existence of a plurality of corporeal agents on the earth’s surface (to which 
the right speaks) occupies a rarely appreciated conceptual space in his mature political 
philosophy. In grounding a particular kind of moral relation that is ‘external’ (as located 
in bounded space) but not property-mediated, it provides us with a fundamentally new 
perspective on Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which I construe as a cosmopolitanism for 
‘earth dwellers’. 




In one of the most enigmatic yet fascinating passages of the Doctrine of Right, Kant 
ascribes to all human beings a ‘right to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their 
will) has placed them’ (DoR 6: 262).1 Interpreters have rarely explored the systematic 
role of this right to be somewhere within the wider structure of Kant’s political 
philosophy or assigned it much prominence, usually focusing instead on the antecedent 
property argument and its relation to the (ensuing) duty of state entrance, or the details 
of Kant’s account of public right and its institutional implications both domestically and 
internationally.
2
 In the present paper, I aim to make up for this neglect. My claim is that 
systematic reflection on the right to be somewhere offers a vital insight into the 
structural significance of embodied agency under conditions of spatial constraint in the 
 2 
Doctrine of Right. Kant’s concern with the concurrent existence of a plurality of 
corporeal agents on the spherical surface of the earth occupies a conceptual space that is 
insufficiently appreciated by interpreters of his mature political philosophy. I will argue 
that it grounds a particular kind of moral relation that is ‘external’ (as located in time 
and space), but not property-mediated.
3
 Awareness of this moral relation also provides 
us with a fundamentally new perspective on Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which I construe 
as a cosmopolitanism for ‘earth dwellers’. 
The argument proceeds as follows: I start with a sketch of the right to be somewhere as 
introduced in the Doctrine of Right’s section on private right. Section 2 points out the 
difficulty of making sense of this right within the broader architectonic of the work, 
given that it eludes classification with regard to Kant’s vital characterization of all rights 
as either ‘innate’ or ‘acquired’. Section 3 develops a novel reading of the conceptual 
foundation of Kant’s global thinking based on this reconstruction: his cosmopolitanism 
is neither one of ‘noumenal’ beings united in their shared humanity, nor of legal-
institutional membership in a shared polity, but one of physical beings that act and 
affect one another in virtue of inhabiting one (limited) space. 
1. Original Acquisition of Land and the Right to be Somewhere 
 
One of the reasons why the right to be somewhere may have largely slipped 
interpreters’ attention is its somewhat marginal position in the text. Kant introduces it 
only after the famously obscure property argument (DoR 6: 245-57), the details of 
which I want to bracket here despite the fact that it has recently taken centre stage in 
exegetical disputes about the Doctrine of Right as a whole.
4
 Having opened the section 
on ‘private right’ with reflections on the conditions of having something external as 
one’s own – in a nutshell, it is (conclusively) possible only in a civil condition (DoR 6: 
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255) – Kant turns to the question how objects can be rightfully acquired (DoR 6: 258). 
In particular, he is interested in the possibility of acquiring something originally, as 
opposed to deriving it from what belongs to someone else (through a contractual 
exchange). It is in this context that Kant makes the crucial claim that 
all human beings are originally (i.e., prior to any act of choice that establishes a 
right) in a possession of land that is in conformity with right, that is, they have a 
right to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them. 
(DoR 6: 262) 
We need to take a closer look at the more immediate context in which this passage 
occurs. The preceding paragraph provides a first hint why Kant would talk about 
something like a right to a place on earth in the context of his discussion of rightful 
acquisition. There he asserts that ‘first acquisition of a thing can only be acquisition of 
land’ (DoR 6: 261). This claim is no less puzzling. Is he saying that I need to own the 
land in order to possess something that is placed on it? That would be odd – while there 
may be a sense in which stable enjoyment of my property right in my car may depend 
on my ability to park it on a ground that I have secure access to, my ownership right in 
itself cannot be contingent on that. Yet, note that Kant is not talking here about 
ownership in the sense of private property (something which I can claim as mine 
regardless of whether I am physically connected to it) at all, but about mere physical 
possession or occupation. Consequently, he is not referring to land in the sense of a 
fenced-in plot of territory – described as ‘residence (sedes), a chosen and therefore an 
acquired lasting possession’ – but merely as ‘habitable ground’ (DoR 6: 261). I want to 
suggest that what Kant is doing here is reflecting on the circumstances of embodied 
agency. An embodied agent I take to be a morally accountable corporeal being capable 
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of acting in time and space. As beings of that kind, humans inevitably make a particular 
kind of seizure: the piece of land that they take up in virtue of the very fact that they are 
spatially extended. Without a place on earth, we couldn’t act and hold others morally 
accountable for their actions, let alone claim objects as ‘ours’. Cases like that of 
refugees or stateless persons illustrate how failing to have one’s place on earth secured, 
and hence being vulnerable to the arbitrary choices of others, essentially deprives 
humans of their moral agency (Ypi 2014: 294-5, Flikschuh 2000: 156-7). So it is the 
very nature of human existence that entails that people’s relationship to the land 
precedes their relationship to other external things.   
This gives us a sense why reflection on the circumstances of human agency might lead 
to something like the idea of a right to be somewhere. And it also provides a possible 
explanation for the right’s puzzling position in the text: Kant can be read to regress from 
reflections on the possibility of property rights to the more fundamental condition of 
raising anything like a claim to an object as ‘ours’ in the first place: being 
acknowledged a place on earth is a necessary presupposition of claiming rights in 
things. Yet, reading on from the pertinent passage, the picture gets more complicated. 
Kant goes on to introduce another fundamental material factor – besides our own 
embodiment – that conditions human existence: the earth’s spherical surface. The 
finitude of the globe, he explains 
unites all places on its surface, for if its surface were an unbounded plane, 
people could be so dispersed on it that they would not come into any community 
with one another, and community would not then be a necessary result of their 
existence on the earth. – The possession by all human beings on the earth which 
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precedes any acts of theirs that would establish rights (as constituted by nature 
itself) is an original possession in common... (DoR 6: 262) 
Humans do not act in empty space, Kant reminds us here, but on the earth’s spherical 
surface. This makes it impossible for them to get out of each other’s ways once and for 
all.
5
 Instead they stand, from the beginning, in a relation of ‘possible physical 
interaction’ (DoR 6: 352) with everyone else globally: where and how we pursue our 
ends necessarily impacts where and how others can do so. This leaves Kant in a 
puzzling situation: on the one hand, there is a sense in which original acquisition of land 
is, qua unavoidability, ‘blameless’: unlike any other acquisition, acquisition of a place 
on earth occurs without individual act or fault but merely by virtue of one’s physical 
entrance into the world (cf. Flikschuh 2000: 157). We just are the kinds of beings that, 
in virtue of pursuing projects and holding each other morally accountable within time 
and space, need to be somewhere. On the other hand, while entering the world itself is 
not something we choose to do, the very fact that we enter the world with the capacity 
for choice and action has normative implications: it implies that ‘the choice of one is 
unavoidably opposed by nature to that of another’ (DoR 6: 267). And what it is to be an 
embodied agent – not just a physical entity taking up space – is to be able to grasp, and 
account for, the normative implications of this fact.  
Kant resolves this dilemma, I want to claim, by attaching strings to the right to be 
somewhere, namely, to conceive of our own legitimate possession of a place as a 
‘possession in common’ (DoR 6: 262) with all others. To think of the earth’s surface as 
possessed in common, that is to say, is an a priori necessary condition of the 
unavoidable act of first acquisition in virtue of one’s coming into the world as an 
embodied agent. While we have a right to be somewhere (otherwise we could not act), 
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we also need to take into account that the piece of space we take up at every particular 
point in time cannot be taken up by any other person. And given that, as Kant explains 
elsewhere, ‘originally no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth’ 
(PP 8: 358), we can do so only by thinking of the earth’s surface as commonly owned. 
Kant thus employs the idea of original common possession of the earth in order to 
visually express what it means to exist as an embodied moral agent, together with other 
such agents, within limited space, namely, to acknowledge that the corollary of one’s 
own right to be somewhere is one’s acknowledgement of others’ equal right. 
While I will return to the notion of original common possession in the last section, let us 
take stock of this section’s attempt to get a first grasp of the right to be somewhere. 
Despite our exclusive focus on a close textual engagement with the relevant passage, we 
can already identify two ways in which it seems to be of broader significance for Kant’s 
mature political philosophy as a whole. First, the right to be somewhere provides us 
with a crucial insight into a fundamental problem that the Doctrine of Right is 
concerned with: corporeal agents that have to share the earth in common with a plurality 
of agents of the same kinds. At this level, we may say, Kant’s political thinking is 
concerned with humans qua ‘earth dwellers’ (Byrd 2009: 107). Unlike lions, rabbits and 
bees, earth dwellers are able to grasp the normative implications of their concurrent 
existence. This insight suggests, second, that the right to be somewhere plays a 
significant role for Kant’s cosmopolitanism. We saw that the mere fact that embodied 
agents can affect and constrain each other with their choices unites them in a 
community with all those who jointly inhabit a bounded territory, the earth. The 
pertinent community of original common possession (whatever its precise nature) is 
global in scope.  
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In order to make good on my claim that the right to be somewhere is of more 
fundamental importance to the Doctrine of Right than is usually granted, we now need 
to go beyond the immediate analysis of the relevant passage and explore its systematic 
role within the broader architectonic of the text. This is what I shall turn to in the 
following section. 
2. Embodied Agency between Innate and Acquired Right 
 
So far we have tried to make sense of the right to be somewhere within the narrow 
confines of a few crucial paragraphs. I will now turn to the bigger picture of Kant’s 
political philosophy and try to relate it to a distinction generally deemed of vital 
importance to the Doctrine of Right’s argumentative structure: that between innate right 
and acquired right. It is not only Kant himself who, by introducing it at earliest stages of 
the text (DoR 6: 237) points us to the distinction’s significance for what is to follow; 
recent interpretative debates on Kant’s political philosophy have confirmed its crucial 
significance for how to understand the Doctrine of Right as a whole.
6
 In this section I 
will seek to fit the right to be somewhere into either of these categories and conclude 
that these attempts are doomed to fail. Yet, as I will show subsequently, this failure 
proves instructive by virtue of throwing a new light on Kant’s cosmopolitanism. 
But let us take a step back first. For the concern with embodied agency under 
circumstances of spatial constraint does not appear for the first time in the published 
version of the Doctrine of Right. It is instructive indeed to observe how Kant struggles 
with it already in the preparatory works. At this stage, he seems to be aware of the 
conundrum emerging from the insight that the space I occupy is, on the one hand, 
‘inseparable from my existence’ (VRL 23: 237) but on the other hand a claim to 
something external to me that has normative implications for others. In the face of the 
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strange conceptual ambiguity that hence accrues to a right to be somewhere, Kant 
dithers noticeably and seems unsure how to fit it into the overall architectonic he 
envisions for his mature political philosophy. Ultimately, he provisionally characterizes 
it as an ‘innate but nevertheless established [entstandenes] right to a thing which should 
not be conceived as acquired because it is connected to my existence’ (VRL 23: 237). 
Surprisingly, in the Doctrine of Right’s published version this ambivalence disappears 
completely – Kant apparently takes himself to have solved the problem. Indeed, the 
distinction between innate right and acquired right is introduced as exhaustive. As he 
explains in a short section called ‘general division of rights’ (DoR 6: 237) that is part of 
(or, possibly, follows upon) the appendix to the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right:  
The highest division of rights, as (moral) capacities for putting others under 
obligations (i.e., as a lawful basis, titulum, for doing so), is the division into 
innate and acquired right. An innate right is that which belongs to everyone by 
nature, independently of any act that would establish a right; an acquired right is 
that for which such an act is required. What is innately mine or yours can also be 
called what is internally mine or yours (meum vel tuum internum); for what is 
externally mine or yours must always be acquired. 
Every right, we are told, belongs to either of two categories: either it is innate, thus 
belonging ‘to everyone by nature, independently of any act that would establish a right’ 
(following a Roman law term that Kant takes up here, it belongs to us ‘internally’), or it 
is acquired, that is it requires an act to be established. Kant goes on to explain that there 
is only one innate right: a right to ‘freedom (independence from being constrained by 
another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance 
with a universal law’ (DoR 6: 237). Surprisingly, the innate right is then, immediately 
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after its introduction and without being further unpacked, ‘put in the prolegomena’ 
(DoR 6: 238) and not taken up again. The main body of the following text goes straight 
into the domain of acquired right (what is ‘externally mine or yours’), i.e. property 
rights broadly construed.  
Note that a particular significance of this distinction lies in the different scope of 
inclusion of the two moral domains that the categories respectively ground. On the one 
hand, the innate right is something all free and finite beings have ‘in virtue of [our] 
humanity’. In contrast, acquired rights (as Kant will argue in subsequent sections) are 
possible only in the ‘civil condition’, that is under a general will that makes coercive 
public laws valid for everyone (e.g. DoR 6: 255). The pertinent kind of property 
relations are thus relations among co-citizens sharing membership in an empirical 
institution that embodies such a will. Acquired right is not only more momentous in its 
implications (ultimately yielding state entrance), the conditions of its possibility are also 
much more challenging to vindicate and require Kant to engage in a complicated 
deduction (DoR 6: 249). Given the architectural momentousness of the distinction 
between the two categories of rights, we would of course like to know how Kant has 
solved the puzzle that caused him so much headache in drafting the work: is the right to 
be somewhere an acquired or an innate right?  
The Right to be Somewhere as an Acquired Right? 
 
The intuitively most plausible answer is of course to classify the right to be somewhere 
as an acquired right. At least this is what Kant’s own placement of the notion in the text 
seems to unequivocally suggest. As seen in the first section, it is introduced in the 
Doctrine of Right’s section on private right, more specifically in the part that is 
concerned with the question ‘how to acquire something external’ (DoR 6: 258). 
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Moreover, this reading seems to be in line with Kant’s conceptual map as just outlined. 
Recall that, as we were told earlier, rights in external objects require an act to be 
established. The definitional point was to distinguish acquired rights from that which is 
ours innately or, in Kant-speak, ‘internally’. It seems to follow that anything external to 
me that I claim as mine must fall under the category of acquired right. My place on 
earth, as occupied by my physical self, is of course external to me. And there is surely a 
sense in which I ‘acquire’ a place on earth in virtue of being born. Yet three reasons 
strongly speak against treating the right to be somewhere as an acquired right. 
First, as I have already briefly mentioned, the category of acquired right is concerned 
with our claims to objects as ‘ours’. What Kant deems interesting when it comes to 
control over external objects is not the possibility of ‘holding’ an object – that there is a 
sense in which I can legitimately call an object ‘mine’ as long as I have it under actual 
physical control (in my ‘empirical possession’) Kant takes as given, but also not very 
interesting. The actual normative challenge is to show the possibility of calling 
something ‘mine’ ‘even though I am not in possession of it’ (DoR 6: 246). It is what 
Kant calls ‘intelligible possession’, possession of an object without holding it, that the 
category of acquired right is primarily concerned with and the possibility of which the 
section on private right aims to prove. Such a non-empirical (intelligible) connection 
between my capacity for choice and action and an object of my choice (ultimately 
parasitic on the possibility of the pertinent relation between persons) amounts to a 
synthetic a priori judgment that requires a deduction in order to be vindicated (DoR 6: 
249).
7
 Importantly, however, the right to be somewhere is limited to physical 
possession, or occupation. It is not a right to this or that specific place (that we could 
claim even in our absence), but a right to be granted a place somewhere on the earth 
such that the conditions of embodied agency are fulfilled. Consequently, Kant specifies 
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in a footnote, ‘merely physical possession of land (holding it) is already a right to a 
thing, though certainly not of itself sufficient for regarding it as mine’ (DoR 6: 251). 
Hence, he continues, the right to be somewhere is ‘consistent with the principle of outer 
freedom’ (ibid.) and does not require a deduction in order to be vindicated – notably 
unlike acquired rights, from which it must thus be systematically distinct. 
Second, while acquired rights require an act to be established, it is highly questionable 
whether our coming into the world is to be considered an act in the relevant sense. In a 
passage of the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant defines an action of 
legal relevance (a factum or ‘deed’) as one whose author can be considered to have 
freely caused it, that is if ‘the agent is regarded as the author of its effect, and this, 
together with the action itself, can be imputed to him’ (DoR 6: 223). Moreover, this 
ability to bring about imputable actions (to be a ‘causa libera’) is precisely what 
constitutes moral personality for Kant (DoR 6: 227). Note that, on this definition, a deed 
is the contrary of both a coerced act and of one that causes an unintended chain of 
events (Kersting 1984: 3). So if in falling off my bike I knock you over, your potential 
injuries cannot be imputed on me. Now Kant seems unsure how to evaluate our coming 
into the world in this respect. As he notes in the preparatory works to the Doctrine of 
Right, my ‘existence is not yet a deed and hence not unjust [injustum]’ (VRL 23: 279). 
On the other hand, there is of course a sense in which I have seized a piece of land in 
virtue of being born (ihn einmal gleichsam apprehendiert habe durch Geburt (VRL 23: 
237) and our physical presence does have an impact on others. Even if we do not enter 
the world at will, we do so with a will and there is even a sense in which we ‘claim 
entitlement to the land [we] occupy’ (Flikschuh 2000: 158) as a presupposition to act in 
the stricter sense. While this means that on some level and in some way we can be held 
to account even for something we have never set out to do, what does nevertheless seem 
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clear is that this cannot be the same as the way in which we are held to account for 
consciously and actively apprehending and claiming things as ours. For notice that the 
obligation we incur in virtue of appropriating objects is indeed far-reaching: property-
acquisition effectively come with a duty of state entrance. The normative implications 
of the ‘sheer facticity of our placement, willy-nilly, on the surface of the earth’ (Shell 
1996: 150), in contrast, do not seem to be that consequential. 
This leads me directly to my third point, which requires a look at the larger structure of 
the Doctrine of Right. We have seen that Kant construes a strong connection between 
acquired right and statehood: the kind of moral relation that would render the exclusion 
of others from objects of one’s choice permissible is possible only under territorially 
organized political authority. Now if the right to be somewhere were an acquired right, 
we would expect a universal duty to enter the state to hold among all agents, who, in 
virtue of their embodiment, ‘acquire’ a place on earth (cf. Niesen and Eberl 2011: 261). 
This duty could take one of two forms. First, Kant could vindicate a global polity. Yet, 
in contrast to the powerful cosmopolitan metaphors we know from other works of the 
critical period,
8
 the political philosophy appears hesitant in vindicating global 
institutions that in any sense resemble the modern state:
9
 the sphere of inter-state 
relations is restricted to a loose, voluntary alliance of states ‘that must be renewed from 
time to time’ (DoR 6: 345). Furthermore, ‘cosmopolitan right’ is restricted to a so-called 
hospitality right (the ‘right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has 
arrived on the land of another’, PP 8: 357). Or alternatively, rather than a duty to enter a 
global state, Kant could prescribe a universal duty to enter a state.
10
 I take it that, in this 
regard, the evidence is at least inconclusive. While there are of course passages where 
Kant remarks that it is ‘wrong in the highest degree’ to remain in a condition that is not 
rightful (DoR 6: 307-8), he is also highly sceptical of any attempt at forcing 
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communities that do not live under state-like political institutions into states.
11
 In both 
Perpetual Peace (PP 8: 358) and the Doctrine of Right (DoR 6: 266), he fiercely 
condemns European states’ colonial practice at the time, whose malicious attempt at 
conquering foreign lands under the false pretext of mere visiting he decries as 
‘inhospitable behaviour’ (PP 8: 358). It seems that in these passages Kant does not only 
want to say that peoples who fail to organize themselves in states cannot be compelled 
to do so, but even to deny that they are committing a wrong in the first place (see also 
Muthu 2003: 199). This textual ambiguity, however, need not undermine our primary 
negative conclusion. For the least we can say is that Kant is very hesitant to suggest 
anything like an analytical connection between the general circumstances of human 
agency and modern statehood, which would indeed leave the latter as a uniquely 
possible living arrangement. Yet given the strong connection, throughout the Doctrine 
of Right, between acquired right and statehood, this is precisely what we would except 
if the right be somewhere was meant to be included in the former category. 
The Right to be Somewhere as an Innate Right? 
 
So while Kant himself introduces the right to be somewhere in the section on acquired 
right, it is hard to make sense of this placement on a systematic level. Authors who have 
approached the notion in more depth have generally agreed with this assessment and 
tended to classify it as somehow contained in the innate right (e.g. Byrd and Hruschka 
2010: 126ff.; Kleingeld 1998: 79, 2012: 84; Benhabib 2004: 25-48). A conclusive 
rejection of this move would require us to develop and defend a comprehensive 
interpretation of the innate right itself, an endeavour which goes beyond the scope of 
this paper. What I want to do instead is to show that on both of the two dominant 
contemporary readings of the innate right, which I will call the relational and the 
foundational views, the right to be somewhere cannot possibly be part of it. To start 
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with, we can register a simple yet indubitable fact as to the pertinent set of rights 
holders: from a table (DoR 6: 240) and a taxonomy (DoR 6: 240) Kant provides, it 
seems clear that ‘humans [Menschen]’ are the subjects of the innate right. Note however 
that this descriptive specification – whosoever can be identified as a member of the 
human species must be accorded an innate right to freedom – leaves open the crucial 
normative question concerning the grounds of the right: what feature of human beings 
precisely gives rise to it? Textually speaking, we need to understand the claim that the 
innate right belongs ‘to every man by virtue of his humanity [Kraft seiner Menschheit]’ 
(DoR 6: 237). Due to their different accounts on this level, relational and foundational 
views end up ascribing different content to the innate right, i.e. specifications of what 
the innate right is a right to. Yet I want to show that, on either construal, the empirical 
circumstances of our concurrent corporeal existence (constituted by the spherical 
surface of the earth) transcend the purview of the innate right. The right to be 
somewhere thus cannot be part of it. 
The first, relational reading (Ludwig 1988: 92-106; Flikschuh 2009: 434-9; 2011b), 
understands the notion of humanity (as grounding the innate right) very much in line 
with that concept’s more familiar meaning in the Groundwork (e.g. Gr 4: 429). There it 
refers to human beings’ noumenal status as expressed in their capacity for morality, i.e. 
to act from pure principles of practical reason alone. While the innate right pertains to 
our capacity for choice, what matters morally is the way in which, in choosing and 
acting, we affect and constrain others. It is with regard to this relation of reciprocal 
influence that the innate right ascribes to every person a certain standing, namely one of 
juridical equality. Accordingly, in terms of content, the innate right describes an a 
priori, formal entitlement affirming the equal validity of everyone’s reciprocal claim to 
be recognized as an agent with full legal status: each has the same moral power to ‘put 
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others under an obligation’ through their choices as everyone else (DoR 6: 237). 
Motivating this reconstruction is an underlying, broader view about the general concept 
of right as operating, like all of Kant’s moral concepts, at the level of intelligible or 
merely rational relations between persons (Flikschuh 2009: 438). It structures a 
particular subcategory of intelligible relations between us as morally accountable 
agents: those which concern the form of each person’s respective exercise of the 
capacity for choice – notably in contrast to Kant’s ethics, which is merely concerned 
with our maxims for action. This picture in mind, the innate right just falls into place as 
the subjective, first-personal formulation of the idea of reciprocal constraint under 
general laws. Within the system of right, understood as an external – but formal and a 
priori – morality, the claims to exercise the capacity of choice of each do not exceed 
those of anyone else.  
Further evidence for the reading of innate right as a formal and reciprocal claim to 
juridical equality is taken from the various ‘authorizations’ (DoR 6: 237) Kant attaches 
to it: innate equality, original innocence and strict reciprocity of juridical obligation. For 
these constitutive features of innate right, which are ‘not really distinct from it’, are all 
specified in strictly relational terms, invoking treatment that each person can rightfully 
expect from all others independently of any acts of theirs. Consequently, on the 
relational reading the main function of the innate right is to deliver a normative 
criterion for legitimate laws of any kind – most importantly, on Kant’s view, those 
regulating relations of acquired right. However, Flikschuh’s (2009: 438) more radical 
claim that the innate right itself gives us no substantive rights entitlements at all does 
not seems to be a necessary implication of this view. Even if the immediate content of 
the innate right is limited to the relationally specified authorizations, the pertinent status 
may entail substantive rights that merely spell out the pertinent status, yet can indeed 
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figure as direct objects of external law-making: Kant mentions the right to freely 
communicate one’s thoughts to others as an example (DoR 6: 238). What is indeed clear 
instead is that the innate right, understood as a purely relational and a priori moral 
claim to a certain moral standing vis-à-vis others, cannot possibly give us a right to 
anything ‘external’ in the sense of a material right to something located in time and 
space – such as the right to be somewhere.  
A second, foundational reading (Ripstein 2009, Hodgson 2010, Stilz 2011, Byrd and 
Hruschka 2010: Ch. 3) grounds the innate right not relationally in moral accountability, 
but foundationally in the capacity of each to set and pursue ends.
12
 Rather than in the 
way persons reciprocally relate to one other as acting agents, the source of innate right 
is located in a higher order capacity of each person respectively. What motivates this 
view is an understanding of the notion of ‘humanity’ as referring to the normative, 
though morally neutral, capacity for free choice. Consequently, the innate right is taken 
to endow everyone with an equal right to set and pursue ends (to exercise ‘external 
freedom’) independently of the wills of other people. People have this right ‘because 
they are persons capable of setting their own purposes’ (Ripstein 2009: 17, my 
emphasis).
13
 Note that on the foundational reading, the normativity of choice is thus 
construed not via its effect on others, but from the value it has for the agent exercising 
it. This shift in emphasis has significant implications concerning the content of the 
innate right, as it turns the focus on the conditions of purposiveness itself. The thought 
is that, since the only way in which individuals can act in the external world is through 
their bodies – ‘having control over my body is essential to my ability to set and pursue 
ends’ (Hodgson 2010: 811) – the innate right at its core describes a right ‘to your own 
person’ (Ripstein 2009: 57). This right to your own person is understood in an explicitly 
physical sense, endowing its subjects with basic powers of bodily self-control. While a 
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more extreme version of this claim almost likens the innate right to a kind of property 
right in one’s body (e.g. Hodgson 2010), Ripstein’s (2009: 68) more moderate version 
cautions that ‘I do not have property in my own person; I just am my own person’. 
These nuances notwithstanding, what proponents of the foundational reading (in 
contrast to the relational view) agree on is that the innate right includes a material right 
to something ‘external’ in time and space: our bodies. From this assumption, an 
additional step suggests itself that further extends this right: for given that we do not act 
in empty space but on the earth’s surface, a right to not have my body interfered with by 
others should include a right to the place on earth that I occupy – the space our bodies 
occupy is necessarily space on the earth’s surface (cf. Ripstein 2009: 372)! Under 
conditions where space is scarce, the right to a place on earth thus just comes with the 
innate right. As Byrd and Hruschka (2010: 128) have it, the right that nobody ‘throw me 
against my will into the ocean or rocket me into the universe’ is supposed to be entailed 
by the ‘the internal (in contrast to the external) mine and thine’.  
While I have no problem with the idea that the subjects of innate right are corporeal 
beings who set their ends using their bodies, it is this further step (from a right to 
control one’s body to a right to be somewhere) that I want to block. Note that if it went 
through, proponents of the foundational reading would have successfully shown that we 
should treat the right to be somewhere as part of the innate right. In order to see why 
this is not the case, we need to have a closer look at the Introduction to the Doctrine of 
Right, where we encounter the innate right. I have already mentioned that it is 
introduced only in (or even after) an ‘appendix’ (DoR 6: 233), attached at the very end – 
the bulk of the Introduction serves to set out the conceptual contours of the domain of 
right more generally as the object of the entire investigation to follow. Kant starts (in 
§B) with the moral concept of right. It is defined as the ‘sum of the conditions under 
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which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a 
universal law of freedom’ (DoR 6: 230) and explicated as pertaining to the formal 
external relation between the power of choice of two or more persons. It is crucial to 
understand what is going on at this stage. Some interpreters (Höffe 1999: 47-50; 
Kersting 2004: 14, 17) take Kant to be developing the concept of right by applying the 
general concept of morality to the basic empirical fact of the coexistence of embodied 
rational beings within limited space. A peculiar kind of anthropology of right (Höffe 
2013: 117ff.) is said to set out the relevant ‘conditions of application’ that make right 
necessary in the first place. Yet notice that there just is no reference to the empirical 
circumstances of human coexistence on the earth in the relevant passage. Neither the 
limited space circumscribed by the spherical surface of the earth, nor the normative 
implications this yields in the face of our own corporeal existence, plays any 
constitutive role in Kant’s development of the moral concept of right. As we have seen, 
these aspects are first mentioned far into the section on private right. Kant’s argument in 
§B is an entirely analytical answer to the question, posed in the antecedent paragraph, 
regarding the necessary and sufficient conditions of legitimacy for any actual body of 
positive laws (Ludwig 1988: 92). 
This is not to say that there is not a sense in which time and space in general matter 
already for Kant’s development of the concept of right: as a matter of definition, rightful 
relations are concerned with external actions, i.e. actions that can be intuited in time and 
space (Ludwig 1988: 86). Yet the particular conditions of bounded space as crucial to 
the right to be somewhere are not in view at this stage of the argument. This becomes 
particularly clear in a memorable yet puzzling statement in §E of the Introduction:  
The law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the freedom of 
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everyone under the principle of universal freedom is, as it were, the construction 
of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure intuition a priori, by analogy 
with presenting the possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of the 
equality of action and reaction. (DoR 6:232/3) 
What I would like to focus on is Kant’s claim that we get the law of reciprocal coercion 
(that he had developed in the prior paragraph from the moral concept of right) by 
constructing the moral concept of right ‘in pure intuition a priori’. What does it mean to 
construct a concept? In a well-known passage of the first Critique (A713/B741), Kant 
explains that the construction of concepts is characteristic for mathematical reasoning 
(cf. Shabel 2014). When we construct a concept we ‘exhibit the a priori intuition 
corresponding to it’ (A713/B741). Kant’s pertinent case for concept construction 
understood in this technical sense is geometry: all we need to do in order to prove that 
two sides of a triangle are together longer than the third side is to ‘construct’ or 
represent such a three-sided figure – whether on paper or in the imagination – in a 
priori space. This is why, as Kant had argued much earlier in the first Critique, 
geometrical cognition is synthetic a priori: it rests on propositions that include an 
extension of cognition independently of all experience (B40). So in the present passage, 
Kant likens juridical space (the form in which we relate to one another externally) and 
geometrical space (the form in which objects appear as outer),
14
 emphasizing that the 
concept of right is constructed with ‘mathematical exactitude’ (DoR 6: 233) in non-
empirical, unbounded space. In analogy to the first Critique’s denomination of space as 
an a priori necessary framework within which it first becomes possible to perceive 
particular objects, here a priori space figures as a formal condition of the construction 
of anything like rights relations in the first place.  
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To sum up: the moral concept of right is modelled on pure intuition a priori – it is 
unbounded a priori space that constitutes a formal condition for the construction of 
something like a general schema of rights relations. It is not until the section on 
acquired right that we move from a vision of rights relations as essentially unbounded 
(extending across possible persons in space indefinitely) to bounded (empirical) space 
and hence the conditions under which these relations play out on the spherical surface 
of the earth. Only once ‘the a priori construction of rights relations [is mapped] onto 
empirical space’ (Flikschuh 2011a: 145) is a possible world in which ‘people could be 
so dispersed on it that they would not come into community with one another’ (DoR 6: 
262) off the table. This is why the empirical circumstances under which rightful 
relations play out on the earth – the concurrent existence of a plurality of corporeal 
agents on the surface of a bounded sphere – are not covered by the moral concepts 
(most importantly, the innate right) introduced by Kant in the Introduction to the 
Doctrine of Right. Even if we follow the proponents of the foundational reading in 
insisting on the corporeality of the agents of right, the right to be somewhere cannot be 
included in the innate right. 
Bringing this section to a close, the right to be somewhere seems to be a rather 
recalcitrant notion. Our systematic reflections have shown that it cannot be made to fit 
either of the categories of innate or acquired right. My aim was not to question the 
usefulness of this distinction as an overall organizing principle for the Doctrine of 
Right, but to cast some doubt upon its exhaustiveness. I have pointed out that the moral 
relation that emanates from insight into the normative implications of our concurrent 
existence, as embodied agents, on the earth displays features of both categories and 
ultimately eludes classification. Relations among earth dwellers can be neither 
accounted for by the status that innate right (however specified) endows us with, nor 
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can it be reduced to membership in man-made political institutions like the modern 
state. That there is such a conceptual space is occasionally even acknowledged in 
passing by interpreters. Herb and Ludwig (1993: 294) for instance remark that human 
beings enter the world as ‘beings who are subject to obligations which are neither innate 
nor freely assumed through an act that establishes an obligation’. The implications of 
this puzzling insight, however, are rarely systematically explored. The main reason for 
this is the general likening in the literature – admittedly following Kant’s own 
presentation – of external relations to property relations. Given its marginal position in 
the text, the fact that relations among earth dwellers are external but not property-
mediated easily slips attention. Yet it constitutes an essential concern of Kant’s 
throughout the mature political philosophy that, as I hope to show in the next section, is 
particularly crucial for his cosmopolitanism. 
3. Earth Dwellers and Cosmopolitan Right 
 
In the last section, I have argued that the right to be somewhere proves unwieldly with 
regard to a conceptual distinction central to Kant’s political philosophy: that between 
innate and acquired right. It endows agents with a moral status that occupies a 
conceptual space in between the (innate) right all free and finite beings have, and the 
(acquired) rights propertied citizens have against each other under a public authority 
issuing coercive laws valid for all. The community of what I have called earth dwellers 
is one among embodied moral agents in direct physical confrontation with each other. 
And, as Kant hastens to add, it is distinctly global: the fact that human beings take up 
space unites everybody in a way that requires us to think of the earth as possessed in 
common. In this section, I will further follow up on this remark and show that the right 
to be somewhere, together with our insight into its peculiar conceptual position, 
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provides us with a new perspective on Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which I reconstruct as a 
cosmopolitanism for earth dwellers.  
The crucial question when it comes to interpreting Kant’s cosmopolitanism concerns the 
very nature of global community: what is it (according to Kant) that unites us with 
everyone else globally? Interestingly, the two most prominent interpretative approaches 
can be read to take their cue from the categories of innate and acquired right 
respectively. Some construe Kant’s cosmopolitanism as depicting a moral community 
among all rational beings qua shared humanity, constituting a ‘kingdom of ends’. On 
this view of Kant as a moral cosmopolitan,
15
 human beings have universal rights and 
obligations in virtue of being joint members of a ‘supersensible world’ (Kleingeld 1999: 
509; see also Benhabib 2004). Others (briefly discussed in section 2) ascribe to Kant a 
distinctly political cosmopolitanism of shared membership in some kind of global 
polity.
16
 This reading takes the notion of ‘world citizenship’ literally, aiming at a 
worldwide legal and political order that unites all human individuals in one political 
body. In contrast to both these dominant approaches, I want to suggest that it is the right 
to be somewhere on which Kant’s global community is modelled. In order to make 
good on that claim, we need to get a better grip on the moral status that actually pertains 
to humans qua earth dwellers. In which way precisely does the spatial or territorial 
dimension of human agency shape our coexistence and what does it mean to account for 
this fact? Is there an identifiable set of entitlements connected to our status as earth 
dwellers? 
Unfortunately, the sparse passages on ‘private right’ that we have focused on so far 
offer little guidance in this regard. Following Peter Niesen, it is rather the section on 
cosmopolitan right that provides important insights concerning the question what the 
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right to be somewhere is a right to (Niesen 2007 and forthcoming; Niesen and Eberl 
2011: 329). And indeed, Kant there essentially repeats the argument now well-known to 
us: in virtue of the fact that ‘nature has enclosed [us] all together within determinate 
limits (by the spherical shape of the place they live in, a globus terraquaeus)’, we stand 
‘originally in a community of land’, which is a ‘community of possible physical 
interaction’ (DoR 6: 352). More specifically, cosmopolitan right is then equated with a 
right to hospitality, that is ‘the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility 
because he has arrived on the land of another’ (PP 8: 357).17 This right entitles a visitor 
of foreign territory to be dealt with justly for the duration of her (temporary) stay and to 
seek what Kant calls ‘commerce’ (broadly understood as including a broad range of 
cultural, economic or political exchange). What hospitality does explicitly not contain is 
a right to remain permanently on the land of a foreign country or even settle there (DoR 
6: 353). In order to get a better grip on this right, Niesen (2007) suggests a closer look at 
the two examples Kant discusses in this context. On the one hand, the negative 
dimension of the right to hospitality figures prominently in his condemnation of 
European states’ colonial practice at the time, whose attempts at conquering foreign 
lands with recourse to misleading claims to hospitality he decries as ‘inhospitable 
behaviour’ (PP 8: 358). Newly ‘discovered’ lands may not be appropriated without the 
consent of those who have already settled in the region. The second group of cases Kant 
considers are those where people end up at some place through no fault or responsibility 
of their own, but merely due to unfavourable circumstances. In a preliminary draft for 
Perpetual Peace (VPP 23:173), Kant discusses the victims of a shipwreck washed 
ashore, as well as sailors seeking refuge from a storm in a foreign harbour (cf. Kleingeld 
1998: 76). Both, he argues, can legitimately claim hospitality rights to remain on the 
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host lands and cannot be returned to the sea or their homeland if this would in any way 
endanger them (PP 8: 358).  
What Niesen takes to be the common denominator in these two examples is an 
affirmation of the fact that ‘we need to be somewhere rather than nowhere, and that we 
need to use and appropriate territory and territorially based stuff’ (Niesen forthcoming: 
20). The right to be somewhere, Niesen thus concludes, includes a substantive set of 
entitlements that account for the ‘territory-based nature of human lives’ (ibid.), or as he 
calls it, our ‘earth citizenship’. The idea of territory-based entitlements is meant quite 
literally: through mere reflection upon our concurrent existence on the earth, Niesen 
hopes to assemble a ‘substantive list of human rights like the one articulated in … the 
Universal Declaration’ (21), including far-reaching entitlements like a transnational 
right to freedom of communication. Yet Niesen’s account of the right to be somewhere 
in terms of ‘earth citizenship’ raises a number of questions that cast doubt on whether 
Kant’s account does actually lend itself to such a list: is his right to be somewhere a 
general right to just any, or to some particular place that, through ‘nature or chance’, I 
happen to occupy? While the case of the shipwrecked person only seems to give us the 
former, Kant’s discussion of non-state peoples points beyond that, to the latter. More 
importantly, how much space do I have a right to? Sure, given that human agency is at 
stake, someone who is locked up in a suitcase fails to have a place on earth in the 
relevant sense.
18
 But beyond that? Why do the relative small nomadic communities 
have a right to occupy the ‘great open regions’ they traverse (DoR 6: 353) – disallowing 
other people, to whom the land might be equally useful, to even settle in the proximity 
of these lands?  
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I think these questions will ultimately have to remain unanswered and point to the limits 
of Kant’s practical philosophy: taking its cue from the fundamental (yet highly 
controversial) distinction between ‘noumena’ and ‘phenomena’, it construes moral 
relations as formal and a priori. We have seen in the last section that, in line with this 
general outlook, his political philosophy is concerned with the reciprocal relation 
between the choices of free and finite embodied reasoners. Contra Niesen, our empirical 
existence as vulnerable beings with bodily needs cannot have direct rights-grounding 
justificatory force, such that their very structure might be taken to equip us with 
substantive entitlements, for instance when it comes to the distribution of resources and 
land. This is why I think Niesen’s analysis of the right to be somewhere in terms of 
‘earth citizenship’ ultimately overestimates the extent to which we can actually get 
anything as substantive as a set of territory-based entitlements out of it.
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In the remainder of this section, I will thus contrast Niesen’s substantial reading of the 
right to be somewhere with a more formal or relational one that suggests a different way 
of accounting for the territorial nature of human existence. On my reading, the right to 
be somewhere grounds a kind of cosmopolitanism that does not come with a substantive 
list of pre-political entitlements that people bring to bear in their interactions, but 
describes a certain quality of interaction: how we ought to deal with one another 
globally. Vindicating this claim requires me to get at the bottom of Kant’s 
characterization of the community of earth dwellers as one of ‘original common 
possession’. In particular, we need to understand just how different the outlook is 
underlying Kant’s invocation of this concept as compared to the natural law tradition, 
with which it naturally evokes associations and against the background of which Kant 
himself developed it. Thinkers in the natural law tradition like Grotius (2005) provide 
an (idealized) historical account of how a common stock of resources and space that 
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God gave to humankind for the satisfaction of their needs is, partly by necessity and 
partly by convention, gradually divided up between individuals and nations. Within that 
narrative, the idea of an original community of ownership figures as a continuing 
constraint on the legitimacy of positive property rules and existing boundaries. In 
contrast, for Kant to characterize global community as one of common possession is not 
to suggest that we should think of its members as jointly owning the planet in any 
straightforward sense. What he wants to say, instead, is that it constitutes the basis of 
people’s possible physical interaction. In his own words, original common possession is 
not ‘a relation to the land (as an external thing) but to other humans in so far as they are 
simultaneously on the same surface’ (VRL 23: 323). The ‘spherical surface’ (DoR 6: 
262) of the earth that Kant makes so much of is not (primarily) significant as a resource 
repository for satisfaction of everybody’s needs, but constitutes the unavoidable 
condition of human social relations. 
Kant thus replaces the material, needs-based principle for the division of the common 
stock of resources and land that he inherits from the natural law tradition with a formal 
argument pointing out systematic relations of interdependence that obtain among 
individuals globally just in virtue of their unavoidable coexistence on the earth. This 
conception of course does not lend itself to substantive implications such as the ones we 
can get out of a more Grotian understanding of common ownership, where natural law 
already contains a principle for the just distribution of resources and land: the principle 
of need as determined by human nature and discerned by reason.
20
 Yet the fact that 
Kant provides us with a deeply relational (instead of material) conception of original 
common possession does not make it any less interesting, or indeed devoid of normative 
implications. The essential purpose of characterizing the community of earth dwellers 
as one of ‘common possession’, I want to suggest, is to point out that the political 
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problematic is fundamentally and irreducibly global for Kant – that humans both need 
to and are able to get to grips with the fact that they have to share the earth in common. 
They need to do so because of the systematic interdependence that obtains among 
individuals globally just in virtue of the reciprocal relation between their choices and 
the ensuing ‘unavoidable unity’ of all places on the earth. Moreover, they are capable of 
critically relating to their own respective standpoints and normatively structuring the 
common space they share.  
Against this background, we can re-read the section on cosmopolitan right with a focus 
on the mode of interaction among embodied agents it prescribes. It is not so much prior 
entitlements that individuals bring to bear in their encounters with each other and other 
states or peoples, but it is a certain way to be dealt with that they can claim. As guests, 
they may ‘present themselves for community’ (PP 8: 358) or at least offer to engage in 
(not demand!) cultural, economic or political exchange (‘commerce’, DoR 6: 352). 
Guests may pass through, but – unless refusal involves their ‘destruction’ – not stay 
against the will of the inhabitants; that is the case even if the inhabitants fail to accord 
with their view of what it is to make proper use of territory. A good example is the case 
of non-state peoples, where Kant prescribes to representatives of European states that 
want to settle on the territory of nomadic peoples to deal with the native inhabitants on a 
contractual basis (DoR 6: 353). That is, they must treat the claims of all those involved 
in the exchange with strict equality and refrain from making deceptive or fraudulent 
offers or persuade them into selling the lands on which they live. It is this requirement 
to interact on the basis of strict reciprocity, as illustrated through the model of a 
contractual relation, that I take to be at the normative core of cosmopolitan right. Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism for earth dwellers is – in line with the relationalism characterizing his 
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practical philosophy more generally – concerned with the quality of human interactions, 
not the quality of matter.  
Let me end this section with a reminder that we should be wary of reducing Kant’s 
global thinking to what he says in the Doctrine of Right’s section on ‘cosmopolitan 
right’, on which I have focused in this section.21 Following the argument developed in 
this paper, his cosmopolitanism constitutes a fundamental element and argumentative 
thread that lies at the very root of his political thinking and pervades it throughout. Yet 
as I hope to have shown in this section, reflections on cosmopolitan right do confirm a 
reading of the latter according to which the community of earth dwellers is not one of 
humanity in the abstract, but in direct physical confrontation with each other. Thus the 
right to be somewhere, as the notion upon which I have constructed this reading, does 
not contain a substantive set of entitlements, but speaks to the global nature of Kant’s 
theorizing more generally: it provides earth dwellers with something like a global 
standpoint from which to negotiate the terms of their coexistence (cf. Milstein 2013). To 
think of oneself as an earth dweller is to think of oneself as participant in a 
cosmopolitan community of individuals whose fates are, in an important sense, 
inevitably bound up with one another but who at the same time have the capacity to 
critically relate to one another and the contingent institutions, boundaries and loyalties 
that separate them.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this essay was to clarify the status, and indeed bring out the conceptual 
importance, of the right to be somewhere in Kant’s political philosophy. My claim was 
not only that sustained analysis of the notion provides a crucial insight into an 
underappreciated concern (working out the normative implications of the coexistence of 
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corporeal agents on the earth’s spherical surface), but furthermore that it comes with a 
novel perspective on his global thinking. On the emerging picture, Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism is neither one of noumenal beings united in their shared humanity, nor 
of actual world citizens sharing a global polity. Instead, it is a cosmopolitanism of earth 
dwellers: embodied rational agents in direct physical confrontation with other such 
agents, with which they have to share the globe in common. This is a cosmopolitanism 
that does not in itself offer effortless institutional guidance for a just world, but rather 
provides agents with something like a global standpoint from which to think and act. 
This shift of focus away from concrete prescriptive recommendations for a global 
political order, to a certain way of framing the problem, goes against the grain of how 
Kant’s political thought tends to be read nowadays: it is the former that interpreters 
typically look for in essays such as Perpetual Peace. But it is the latter, I hope to have 






 Volume and page numbers refer to the Prussian Academy edition of Kant’s writings 
(Kant 1900 - ). Abbreviations used are DoR (Doctrine of Right), Gr (Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals), PP (Towards Perpetual Peace), for translations from which I 
have used those of Mary Gregor (Kant 1996); also:VRL (Vorarbeiten zur Rechtslehre), 
VPP (Vorarbeiten zu Zum Ewigen Frieden). Citation of the Critique of Pure Reason is 
in standard A/B format, using the Guyer and Wood translation (Kant 1999). 
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 This absence is notable for instance in the edited volumes by Timmons (2002) and 




 Through much of this paper, I will equate the category of acquired right with that of 
property rights, thus neglecting the further titles of contract and status. I take it that 
property has a kind of conceptual priority in the sense of constituting a ‘paradigm case’ 
that most clearly illustrates what Kant considers problematic about ‘having external 
objects as one’s own’ (DoR 6: 245) in general. Most importantly, the corresponding 
kind of acquisition (DoR 6: 260) – by deed, as opposed to by agreement (contract) and 
as required by law (status) – is uniquely problematic in putting (unaffected) others 
under an obligation through a unilateral act. This priority relation notwithstanding, let 
me also emphasize that the two other instances of acquired right share with property the 
two crucial features that my discussion will focus on: on the one hand, they are material 
rights to something external located in time and space – a right to ‘another's choice’ 
(DoR 6: 270) and to ‘a person akin to a right to a thing’ (DoR 6:260). Second, the 
pertinent rights require acts to be established – an act that brings a contract into 
existence, or one that brings people into the respective fiduciary relation (e.g. marrying 
or begetting a child). Hence, regardless of how one stands to the claim from conceptual 
priority, my exclusive focus on property does not actually change the substance of my 
discussion. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for urging me to clarify this. 
4
 See for instance Byrd and Hruschka 2010, Flikschuh 2000, Ripstein 2009. 
5
 Kant notably also thinks that more anthropological factors like humans’ predisposition 
for sociality and their commercial spirit will necessarily drive them towards each other 
(see e.g. Muthu 2003: 172-209). 
6
 As an example, consider the exchange between Flikschuh (2011b) and Ripstein 
(2011).  
7
 The details of this deduction are obscure and perennially contested. Given that the 
textual order seems to partly break down at the relevant passage it is not even clear 
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whether Kant does in fact provide the ‘Deduction of the concept of merely rightful 
possession of an external object (possessio noumenon)’ (DoR 6: 249) that §6 
announces. While Ludwig (1988) suggests a relocation of part of §2 to §6 in order to 
replace what he considers the missing deduction, others like Byrd and Hruschka (2010) 
resist that move. 
8
 See the pertinent notions from the ‘moral world’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
through the ‘realm of ends’ in the Groundwork, to the moral cosmopolitan community 
in the Religion (cf. Kleingeld 2011: 161-4). 
9
 This has traditionally bothered Kantians with strongly cosmopolitan inclinations, who 
have argued that were Kant to have taken seriously his own moral universalism, he 
should have embraced more ambitious ideals like world citizenship and global 
democracy (e.g. Held 1995), or even a full-blown world state (recently Hodgson 2012).  
10
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to consider this additional 
option. 
11
 See for instance the contributions by Kleingeld, Niesen, and Stilz in Ypi and 
Flikschuh (2014). 
12
 Ripstein is indeed ambivalent between the foundational and the relational readings. 
While sometimes he talks about innate right as according a relational entitlement 
‘within a system of reciprocal limits of freedom’ (Ripstein 2009: 34), his prevalent talk 
of purposiveness, bodily self-control and self-mastery as normatively basic (e.g. 24) 
makes his account at least ambivalent between the two. See also Flikschuh 2011b. 
13
 The present reading is foundational not only in this, but also in the further sense that 
the innate right is then taken as the ‘axiomatic’ (Byrd and Hruschka 2010: 77) and most 
basic right from which all other rights – most importantly acquired rights – are derived. 
14




 On the distinction between moral and political cosmopolitanism in wider debates 
about global justice, see Kleingeld and Brown 2014. 
16
 This has been a widespread view particularly since interpreters rediscovered Kant’s 
essay on Perpetual Peace in the 1990s, see e.g. Habermas 1997. 
17
 Cosmopolitan right itself has only recently received increased attention in the 
literature, with different motivations: Benhabib (2004) makes it fruitful as a way to 
think about refugee and asylum rights; Byrd and Hruschka (2010: 205-11) take it to be 
dealing with rights to engage in international trade; Niesen (2007: 90–108) stresses its 
role within Kant’s critique of colonial occupation.  
18
 Thanks to Markus Willaschek for this example. 
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 An anonymous reviewer has suggested to me yet another (though equally substantive) 
reading, according to which the right to be somewhere obliges us to acknowledge the 
acquired rights of others without a duty to jointly proceed into the civil condition. 
However, this would imply that objects could be conclusively acquired prior to the 
pertinent cosmopolitan encounter, which I deem impossible due to the reasons set out in 
this section. This motivates my procedural solution, according to which the right to be 
somewhere does not anticipate any full-blown material rights but endows individuals 
with certain procedural entitlements that they can bring to bear in (unavoidable) 
interactions. 
20
 Grotius for instance famously envisions a right of necessity that sanctions the revival 
of what he construes as a primitive use right (thus licensing the needy’s taking from the 
surplus of property holders) in cases of extreme and unavoidable hardship. 
21
 I agree with Niesen’s (2007) reconstruction of cosmopolitan right as – partly – 




 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the LSE Political Philosophy 
Workshop and the Princeton Political Theory Graduate Conference. I am grateful to the 
audiences at these events for helpful questions and comments, as well as to Katrin 
Flikschuh, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Ben Hoffmann, Karoline Reinhardt, Arthur 
Ripstein, Annie Stilz and Lea Ypi for feedback at various stages as well as two 
anonymous reviewers of this journal for their insightful comments. My views on the 
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